This text is the English translation of the article published in French on the website of the Observatoire du décolonialisme on May 20, 2023, under the title. "Réponse à Haoues Seniguer par l’anthropologue Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, chargée de recherche (HDR) CNRS"
**
Response to Haoues Seniguer by the Anthropologist Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, Researcher (HDR) at CNRS
The journal Mizane published an interview with Haoues Seniguer titled "Le Frérisme et ses réseaux : Un essai saturé de jugement de valeur" ((NdT : "Brotherism and its networks : An Essay Saturated with Value Judgments) in which it aims to "evaluate" the scientific value of my work. The political scientist, who had already attracted attention in February at the tribune of Musulmans de France, engaged in this ad hominem attack in a journal known for promoting Brotherist theses.
Here is the response from anthropologist Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, Researcher (HDR) at CNRS:
Since this is the only critique I have received so far, and it comes from a lecturer at Sciences Po Lyon, and since it is circulating in academic circles, I will respond to it. This will allow me to illustrate what I wrote in my book: even if one claims to be critical of the Brotherhood and its ideology—as is the case with Haoues Seniguer—by denying the plan (the "P" dimension of the Vision-Identity-Plan triptych that I present in my book), one places the Brotherism (Brotherhood's ideology) in the blind spot of knowledge, and worse, risks serving its cause.
The 37,000-character text of my critic is dense and sometimes repetitive. I therefore propose to proceed with a pruning that will lighten it of elements that have no place in a text that claims to offer a lesson in science (cf. the title).
I will distinguish:
– The sophistry containing elements of discredit (appeal to authority, denigration, damage to reputation, accusations of stupidity, manipulation)
– From the "simulated" refutation that does not respect the theoretical and conceptual framework of the author
– From the actual refutation.
I will first address the elements of sophistry. This will demonstrate how the author of this text attempts to disqualify and discredit both the book and its author. Whenever the weakness of his arguments against the work becomes apparent, he attacks the author of the book, denouncing intentions and hostile, conspiratorial, and even racist postures towards Muslims.
1. Sophistry, Discrediting, Accusations, and Appeals to Authority…
Throughout his text, the political scientist, claiming to be concerned with giving a lesson in "science," employs emotional tactics such as diversion, accusations of racism, doubt, and victimization in order to discredit the book—labeled as a libel, i.e., a satirical, insulting, and defamatory piece of writing—and to disqualify its author.
The critic’s attack is so constant and so well-distributed from the beginning to the end of the text that it seems to have been inspired by a sense of fury.
"The work "leans more towards being an essay, an opinion piece, and a libel, rather than science and proper analysis";
"Our colleague claims to be receiving death threats; she turns these threats into ‘a media resource’";
She prevents "scientific and public debate (...) through her outbursts and criticisms towards many academics cited in the book";
"Is it because of my Islamic background or my surname that I am suspected of being associated with the Brotherism?";
"Can one seriously work on a subject that one no longer engages with? That seems highly unlikely to me";
"FBB would have undoubtedly benefited from verifying a certain number of allegations, which, when combined, ultimately highlight significant flaws and inconsistencies in reasoning";
"I won’t dwell on the glaring methodological flaws";
"In my view, this book does not meet the necessary criteria for empirical investigation, nor the broader requirements of social sciences";
"Here, we are clearly dealing with, at the very least, a case of moral panic, if not pure fantasy bordering on specious blindness";
"The investigation is entirely one-sided";
"She does not take care to verify her information";
The accusation of conspiracy is present thanks to a crude syllogism: "The book is not conspiratorial in itself, but it contains conspiratorial tendencies. The ideas developed within it offer no immunity against conspiracy theories. Quite the opposite."
Using an enemy’s argument to attack another is a divisive tactic. Here, it aims to devalue the author through the preface writer by fabricating a scenario: "It’s likely that FBB sought to legitimize her book by asking Gilles Kepel to write the preface. He accepted; that’s his choice. However, I’m not at all sure that he’s genuinely pleased that his name and reputation are entangled in the controversies and passions that the book has sparked in the media, and that the researcher sometimes fuels and sustains, perhaps clumsily."
"FBB may think the worst of Islamism and the Brotherism, and advocate against them as she does";
"This book is primarily an essay, a ‘biased compilation’ of existing material on the subject of Islamism";
"This essay (…) is saturated (…) with one-sided value judgments, in other words, openly disparaging ones";
"The definition of the Brotherism proposed in this book is, indeed, so broad that it becomes ineffective, or, at the very least, stigmatizing."
The reader can thus see the mindset with which the political scientist intends to offer an "evaluative critique" of my book. While he seems to have read it, or at least consulted some passages (his critique is mostly focused on the introduction and conclusion), and identified two typos indeed present in the book, he does not appear to have understood its overall structure, conceptual framework, or the defining elements around the central axis: Vision, Identity, Plan, which I refer to as the Islam-system. He strikes here and there, wherever he can.
2. Arguments That Appear to Be Refutations
I refer to arguments "that appear to be refutations" as those that are presented outside the framework proposed by the author to defend their thesis.
In principle, a refutation aims to counter an argument, meaning the set of arguments used to convince others of the validity of a thesis. This thesis comes from a particular point of view. A point of view is never scientific in itself; what is scientific is the demonstration, which must follow certain rules, including that of falsifiability. My thesis is refutable and even falsifiable in the Popperian sense, but here it is neither refuted nor falsified.
To refute properly, the refuter must first demonstrate that they have understood the author's thesis and what the latter intends to show. The political science lecturer disregards this step and proceeds to a methodless dissection.
Thus, we find a series of criticisms delivered outside of any framework, relying on quotes taken out of context. It is less an act of falsification than a fraudulent operation aimed at imposing one’s views by crushing those of the opponent (mine).
1.Some passages from the book are truncated, as in this example: "What is more serious from a moral and social standpoint is to say, without restraint, that ‘the Brotherism accompanies militant jihad’ (p. 32)"; However, what I wrote is quite different: "The Brotherism accompanies militant jihad, which harasses and terrorizes, with an intellectual project…"
This truncated sentence allows him to make me say something I never wrote and to attribute to me confusing statements: "Every real or supposed brotherist de facto endorses and justifies jihadism…"
2. "When reading, one indeed hesitates between perplexity and dismay, especially when one considers the limited influence, which is in no way a power of coercion, of European Muslims in general and French Muslims in particular. Why? She first writes that the Brotherism is a kind of European version of Islamism, only to then argue, in essence, that what Islamists in predominantly Muslim contexts, particularly in the Arab world, have failed to achieve—the caliphate— brotherists in Europe is both willing and capable of accomplishing, in the form of a global Islamic society. And there are few, if any, concrete, factual proofs of this project."
H. Seniguer claims that the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood is limited. He believes that European Brotherhood members cannot achieve what Islamists in Muslim countries have failed to establish: the caliphate. He completely disregards the accumulated evidence—attested to by numerous works cited in footnotes and in the bibliography—highlighting the Brotherhood's intention to eventually establish an Islamic society in Europe. He has not noticed, or does not want to see here—just as in my previous book *Le Marché Halal ou l’Invention d’une Tradition* (Seuil, 2017)—the intention to create a halal normative framework that would render society Sharia-compliant before it potentially becomes Islamic.
3. Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926-2022) is presented as a kind of *Deus ex machina*, omniscient and omnipotent; in the sense that, as a well-known mentor of the Brotherism, he supposedly planned everything, even predicting the foretold Islamist conquest. Yet, no interview excerpts with notorious "Brotherists" from France or elsewhere come close to supporting this bias. Why, indeed, was there no effort to verify these views by questioning the individuals most directly involved about their connections to the legacy of Hassan al-Banna and Yusuf al-Qaradawi?
Or, alternatively,
"Why not include excerpts from contemporary speeches, even those published on social media and the official website of the so-called ‘Brotherist’ federation, Musulmans de France (formerly Union des organisations islamiques de France)?"
I report and analyze the plan and priorities of the "Islamic movement," the areas of action, the jurisprudence of balance and its art of deception, the political organization by population segments, and Qaradawi’s strategy of moderation through his own writings. Yet the author claims that I merely described an omniscient and omnipotent *Deus ex machina*, which I neither wrote nor thought. He is free to reduce in a few words what I have developed in an entire chapter.
To verify Qaradawi’s plan, Haoues Seniguer suggests conducting interviews with "notorious Brotherists" (sic) (despite the Brotherhood being a secretive organization and every verified member denying their affiliation) while simultaneously questioning the "Brotherist" nature of the public face of the Brotherhood: Musulmans de France (formerly Union des organisations islamiques de France).
It should be noted that if the researcher proceeds in this manner with a secretive organization, he is more likely to be used as a mouthpiece than to be informed by it.
In my book, I recount that when I began my investigations with the Brotherhood in the early 1990s (the critic, who was only about twelve years old at the time, did not experience that era), it took me several months to understand how the Brotherhood used students and researchers to increase their relational, social, and cultural capital. Those who didn’t play along were excluded under the pretext of "racism" (see pp. 28-30).
In general, the researcher should know that one does not ask interviewees to validate scientific hypotheses; rather, one tests hypotheses with them, which is different. The relativistic trend of having knowledge validated by interviewees has largely contributed to obscuring the Brotherist's plan. This is a recent flaw in social sciences to which I dedicate two chapters of my book (notably, the Brotherism and its allies in social sciences, the theses denying Islamism, the Brotherism and anthropology, classic anthropologists Geertz and Gellner, the Asadian turn: why anthropologists prefer Salafism).
4. "The utopia of the caliphate, even among legalist Islamists operating in predominantly conservative Muslim contexts, such as Abdelillah Benkirane in Morocco, has been largely abandoned."
The author uses the terminology of "legalist Islamists" specific to political scientist François Burgat and his followers, referring to Islamists ready to side with democracy by abandoning the utopia of the caliphate. In this book, I demonstrate that even if some Islamists wished to do so—something rarely proven—their willingness to abandon the primacy of Sharia would make them cease to be Islamists, ipso facto. I dedicate a chapter to showing how this belief in an Islamism without Sharia has also actively contributed to obscuring the Brotherist’s project.
5. So, are the "Brotherists" supposedly capable of accomplishing in the European context, where they have no power or significant institutional influence, what their counterparts, with mass parties, failed to achieve in the land of the Commander of the Faithful or within regimes where Islam is the state religion? Here, we are clearly dealing with either a case of marked moral panic or, at the most, pure fantasy bordering on specious blindness.
The weakness of the argument always drives its author, helpless, towards denunciation. It is fashionable to accuse an opponent, against whom one has no counterarguments, of being under the influence of "moral panic." What the political scientist fails to grasp is that the Brotherism, by using soft power and soft law in secularized, multicultural, and inclusive European societies (I develop these points in two chapters), bypass politics, and focus on cultural and economic aspects (halal market), avoiding confrontation with the States as much as possible. *Entrism* is much better suited to the European environment, where Islam is still poorly understood in its variations and specifics, than to Muslim countries where the grassroots Islamization techniques of the Brotherhood have been known for nearly a century.
6. Moreover, rather than analyzing Islamism and the Brotherism *in situ*, based on contemporary, renewed, and updated field data, FBB studies it primarily through the lens of very old texts, generally undated, by theorists unrelated to the European Islamic field.
Qaradawi, who presided over the European Council for Fatwa and Research for a long time before his death in 2022, is neither old nor foreign to the European Islamic field—quite the opposite. What I analyze comes from data collected directly over several years, from hundreds of referenced sources cited in 437 footnotes, and listed in a comprehensive bibliography.
7. FBB portrays *wasatiyya* as the trademark of the Brotherism; this contradicts the works written in Arabic by Egyptian intellectual Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943-2010), who was far from being suspected of collusion with Islamism. The latter explicitly argues that "the ideology of moderation" most likely originates from the work of the jurist-imam-theologian, al-Shafi’i (767-820).
This objection is fallacious. I have never written anywhere that *wasatiyya* was the "trademark" of the Brotherism alone.
8. H. Seniguer advises referring to the objectives stated on the "Musulmans de France" website as if these reflected not the federation’s communication, but its actual beliefs.
He cautiously adds this notable sentence:
"We are certainly not obliged to take the members of the organization in question at their word, but, in that case, one should be able to provide evidence to the contrary, which FBB does not do."
So, we must either take the actors’ justifications as a given or prove that they are lying. In doing so, 150 years of sociology are suddenly dismissed.
3- Response to What Remains
The author’s critique focuses primarily on the introduction and conclusion, where 1) I announce what I will demonstrate based on a societal problem (the Brotherism) and 2) I suggest what could be done to address it after the demonstration has been fully laid out in the chapters.
The researcher criticizes me for not producing a "cold" analysis.
In this book, I do indeed take a position, but only in the introduction and conclusion, while the 10 chapters are devoted to the demonstration.
Why do I consider the Brotherism as an action system whose influence needs to be limited? Because the Brotherism seeks to impose in universities a form of Islamization of knowledge, meaning knowledge that would only be developed within the confines of the Islamic framework.
I take a stand against this project because its emergence is incompatible with the profession of a scientist. It seems logical to me that a researcher should be concerned not only with applying science but also with ensuring the conditions for its possibility and reproduction.
The political scientist writes:
"In the end, it’s one of two things: participating in social and political life as a Muslim or as a Muslim, risks being accused of *entrism*, resorting in this regard to ‘cunning,’ etc. Staying out of public life, while still visibly attached to Islam, means being labeled as ‘separatist’… Ultimately, behind the brotherist lies the observant Muslim, attached in one way or another to Islamic norms, and behind the latter, a potential jihadist lies dormant."
Or:
"In other words, any Muslim actor, real or presumed, who speaks critically about public policies towards Islam and Muslims, or against Islamophobia, is likely to be accused of Brotherism."
He criticizes me for considering participation in social and political life "as a Muslim or as a Muslim" (sic) to be a problem: in this sense, I cannot contradict him. Participating in social and political life while claiming another citizenship than that of the State is like wanting to play a game while announcing that you will follow the rules of another game.
Muslim citizenship does not exist in the French Republic; what exists is French citizenship, which grants rights and assigns duties to everyone, regardless of their beliefs, values, religious or philosophical practices.
The author criticizes me for thinking that visible attachment to Islamic norms is a form of separatism: here again, I do not contradict him. Common norms and values are the clockwork of national cohesion.
He also disputes the idea that behind a brotherist, there could be a jihadist. Yet the Brotherism shares with jihadism, if not the means, then at least the caliphate goal. But the political scientist has chosen to ignore the chain of responsibility that can exist between a Brotherist organization and the murderer who beheads, as happened in the case of Professor Paty.
2. "There is a constant feeling that social actors are incapable of change, of evolution, and that they are, on the contrary, invariably engaged in calculation, moreover, a perfidious one."
This is often the case. The Salafi indoctrination, spread by the Brotherism through many French-language publishing houses, invites every Muslim to engage in the most frequent practices and invocations possible at every age, period, or event in life. Apps distribute daily reminders. Through books and videos distributed by numerous bookstores, followers are encouraged from a young age to organize their daily lives around halal norms, aligning themselves with the path from the past of the pious ancestors to the future of Islamic society. This indoctrination is so constraining that it can induce calculated and hypocritical behaviors.
The political scientist denies this dimension of psychic and physical conditioning, which he cannot ignore, preferring to accuse the one reporting it of conspiratorial and catastrophic intentions: "One of the characteristics of a conspiracy theorist is their resolutely catastrophic vision. In other words, the peril is there, at our doors, but only a handful of the awakened can see it."
3. H. Seniguer writes: "Any contesting and critical discourse from Muslim or non-Muslim circles regarding public policies or opinions aimed at dealing with, or talking about, Islam and the Muslim presence could be interpreted, a priori or a posteriori, as a justification of physical violence."
He argues that if one adopted my thesis, the words of anyone (whether Muslim or non-Muslim) who speaks critically of public policies in defense of Muslims could justify physical violence against Muslims. This is, of course, a very serious and completely unfounded accusation, attributing criminal intentions to my book.
This technique is one used by organizations fighting against Islamophobia (one of the central activities of the Brotherhood’s second generation in Europe), who have made this suspicion a formidable weapon: the accusation of structural Islamophobia prevents society from defending itself against Islamism. Coming from a university, from a researcher paid by taxpayers, this is an infamy.
Conclusion
For several decades, social sciences in France have given significant attention to the theory of legalistic political Islam, allowing themselves to imagine a European Islamism compatible with democracy.
To impose this theory, any other viewpoint was criminalized. This was done without encountering real opposition because no one truly dared to confront and contradict a reassuring thesis. The Brotherism imposed itself notably by locking down criticism and forbidding the contemplation of the doctrinal programmatic dimension under the threat of being accused of Islamophobia and conspiracy theorizing.
By bringing this dimension to light, my book has triggered fury.
Comments